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Problem definition: Is a committee comprised of more or less cognitively diverse members better at
approving the “good” projects and rejecting the “bad” ones?
Academic/Practical Relevance: We contribute in the operations management literature by accounting
for the fact that critical selection decisions are often made by a committee rather than a single decision-
maker. Understanding how the magnitude of diversity a↵ects the decision quality of such a committee is an
important consideration for practitioners.
Results: We utilize a game-theoretic model to show that diverse perspectives are rarely “averaged out”.
Instead, diversity leads to systematic biases in project selection. To mitigate the e↵ect of diverse perspectives,
managers need to uncover the sources of diversity: do they originate from di↵erent individual valuations and
preferences, or they express di↵erent assimilations of the information that arises during the project execution?
We show that this distinction is crucial. Higher preference diversity always leads to higher likelihood of
making the wrong decision. Higher interpretive diversity, may be beneficial for the organization.
Managerial Implications: A clear managerial action is the need to identify and reduce such preference
diversity. Senior management can achieve this by highlighting the need for more transparency in the pipeline
of the business units. Moreover, our analysis shows that interpretive diversity can be a powerful managerial
lever to influence the propensity for Type I and II errors. The latter might be easier to manage than the
organizational structure.
Key words : project management, project termination decisions, executive committees, strategic voting,
diversity
1. Introduction
Organizations constantly face the challenging decision to continue or terminate risky innovation
projects. Such go/no-go decisions lie at the core of the stage-gate process (Cooper 2009). At
each gate executive committees evaluate individual projects to determine progress. A context that
exemplifies the tradeo↵s associated with such decisions is the drug development process (Cook et al.
2014). Pharmaceutical organizations have to decide whether a compound has achieved satisfactory
proof of concept (a stage called Phase IIa) to progress to more advanced and expensive clinical
trials (Phase IIb). A compound’s e cacy (i.e., whether or not the drug works) is a necessary
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but not su cient evidence for progression. According to Arrowsmith (2011), 29% of compounds
are terminated at that stage due to strategic reasons, such as low expected return-on-investment,
rather than technical ones, such as their low e cacy or side-e↵ects, etc. This highlights the strategic
importance of the decisions made at such milestones, and therefore, the need for senior executives
that represent the di↵erent divisions of the organization.
Consider GlaxoSmithKline’s decision process: “If a compound survived to the end of Phase IIa,
the leadership of the Center of Excellence for Drug Discovery (CEDD) would have the option to
present the compound to the centralized Development Investment Board (DIB). Presentation before
the DIB represented the first point at which corporate-level R&D executives (i.e., those outside
of the CEDD) had the ability to make decisions about the progress of specific compounds through
the discovery pipeline. The members of this board -executives from both the R&D and commercial
organizations within GSK- would solicit information, as needed, from other individuals and would
render a final determination on whether the CEDD had achieved proof of concept (PoC) for the
compound... Ultimately, PoC would imply that a CEDD had provided su cient evidence of safety
and e cacy to justify investment in the expensive, late-stage development of a compound.” (p.9
Huckman and Strick 2010).”
The establishment of such a centralized committee as the key governance structure for mak-
ing such capital-intensive decisions is typical in the pharmaceutical industry (Behnke and Huel-
tenschmidt 2010) as well as other industries where major new projects are undertaken (Cooper
2009). By design, a key feature of these committees is their diverse nature: participants often span
all functions (from pharmacology to pharmacokinetics) and product lines (therapeutic areas) of
the organization. According to a senior executive who heads such a committee, this diversity is
essential. It ensures that critical assumptions are scrutinized from di↵erent angles (Pangalos 2016).
The discussion about the necessity of diverse perspectives in such committees reveals a funda-
mental tension: on one hand, diversity in perspectives ensures the inclusion of di↵erent viewpoints
and criteria, and therefore it enables more comprehensive evaluation, and presumably, better deci-
sions. On the other hand, though, executives that hold diverse business roles, and therefore abide
to di↵erent strategic priorities, introduce their own biases and objectives, which might challenge
the decision-making process. In this paper we address a research question that stems from this
tension: is a committee comprised of more or less cognitively diverse members better at approving
the “good” projects and rejecting the “bad” ones?
This fundamental tradeo↵ regarding the role of membership diversity in committees of product
development processes has received sparse attention in the extant literature. The new product
development (NPD) and innovation literatures, have recognized the e↵ects of information asymme-
try within organizational hierarchies for go/no-go decisions in development processes (Chao et al.
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2014). However, these earlier studies have not accounted for the key fact that, in many contexts,
including the aforementioned major milestones in the pharmaceutical industry, such decisions are
made by executive committees rather than a single decision maker. The organizational design
literature has contemplated the e↵ects of committee size and selection rules on decision making
(Csaszar and Eggers 2013). However, they have not considered the reality of strategic interactions
and information asymmetries among the committee members.
We build a game-theoretic model that considers the e↵ects of both strategic interactions and
information asymmetries. Accounting for the strategic interactions is critical. It ensures a richer
social process of decision making that remains consistent with rationality: each member takes
into account the fact that the outcome of the decision process, and therefore, her payo↵, does
not depend on her choices alone, but also on those of her peers. The literature has termed such
rational decision-making as strategic voting (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). This contrasts, naive
or sincere voting whereby a member incorrectly acts as if her vote alone determines her payo↵
(Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). Our model builds upon the concept of strategic voting, the
predominant methodology of formalizing strategic interactions in the extant literature on decision-
making committees (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, Hao and
Suen 2009).
Moreover, our model accounts for information asymmetries that capture diverse viewpoints
amongst the committee members. The seniority of such committee membership implies that the
participants bear significantly di↵erent views as to what constitutes a successful outcome (Eisen-
hardt et al. 1997, Smith and Tushman 2005). Eisenhardt et al. (1997) stress that: “The likelihood
of conflict is further exacerbated by the fact that senior executives usually lead their own large
and important sectors of the corporation. So, they receive information and pressure from their
own unique constituencies within the firm and form objectives that reflect their di↵ering responsi-
bilities. (p. 43, Eisenhardt et al. 1997) A recent report by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)
for the pharmaceutical industry echoes the same issues for such executive committees: “...whose
[the executives’] natural tendency might be to prioritize the interests of their functions rather than
to promote the enterprise view. (p.19, Tollman et al. 2016). The report also highlights that it is
precisely the highly risky and novel nature of the R&D initiatives that allows for the members’
interests to remain undetected, particularly when the decision concerns project terminations.
We analyze the e↵ect of diverse viewpoints on a committee’s decision making process and out-
come accounting for two distinct forms of cognitive diversity: (i) preference diversity, which we
define as the committee members’ di↵erent valuations about the project; (ii) interpretive diversity,
which we define as the di↵erent emphasis that the committee members place on their privately
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observed information signals regarding the project’s likelihood of success. The former reflects dif-
ferences in the perceived opportunity costs and outside options that each committee members
face (Eisenhardt et al. 1997). The latter represents the existence of di↵erent “thought worlds”
(Dougherty 1992) among the committee members, which prompt them to filter the new informa-
tion in di↵erent ways. Therefore, some members might assign very high informational value to
their signals, while others might choose to ignore them.
Our analysis sheds light on the complex e↵ect of diversity on a committee’s selection outcomes.
First, we show that diverse perspectives are rarely “averaged out”. Instead, it is important for man-
agers to understand whether those diverse perspectives stems from di↵erent preferences or di↵erent
interpretations of new information. Preference diversity is always detrimental for a committee’s
decision outcome. Specifically, under preference diversity, committees not only become more likely
to reject projects that would have succeeded, but also to accept projects that are bound to fail.
Interestingly, the e↵ect is intensified in contexts with more reliable information. On the contrary,
interpretive diversity may act as a powerful lever to improve the decision making process. We find
that interpretive diversity counterbalances the type of decision making error that is more costly for
a particular project context. For projects with high opportunity cost, interpretive diversity leads to
more conservative decisions that reduce the likelihoods of investing in expensive bad projects. For
projects with low opportunity costs, higher interpretive diversity enables more aggressive decisions
that reduce the chance of forgoing valuable opportunities.
2. Literature Review
In product development, management is charged with the task of reviewing a project’s progress
and making selection decisions. Such decision-making rules are among the most widely adopted
practices (Cooper 2009). Recent literature recognizes the organizational enablers of such processes
and stresses the e↵ects of information asymmetries on such decisions.1 Chao et al. (2014) develop
a model that accounts for the fact that go/no-go decisions are often made by senior executives
while project managers are responsible for the project execution. The latter are likely to be more
informed about the details of the project, and as such, incentives need to be properly structured to
mitigate potential misalignments. When the uncertainty of the value of an idea is high, information
asymmetry forces an organization to reject projects that would have been profitable. Unlike this
literature, which looks at hierarchical organizational structures (between a principal and an agent),
the focus of our paper is on senior executive committees where members have an egalitarian status.
1 A large body of literature treats go/no-go decisions as optimal stopping problems, where a single project manager
optimizes the continuation or not of a project under di↵erent uncertainty regimes (e.g., Huchzermeier and Loch 2001)
We are not reviewing it here as the tradeo↵s discussed in that literature are fundamentally di↵erent than ours (e.g.,
that literature overlooks information asymmetries and their e↵ect on strategic interactions within organizations).
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NPD studies have also looked at the e↵ects of group diversity, albeit in settings di↵erent than
ours. Kavadias and Sommer (2009) study the e↵ect of group diversity on idea generation. They
show that a diverse group outperforms a group of individuals who work independently in problems
where cross-functional input is required. Wu et al. (2014) study how diversity in the cost salience
of the project workers a↵ects the performance of the project. Cost salience refers to the tendency
of an individual to perceive the cost of immediate e↵ort to be larger than the cost of future e↵ort,
leading to procrastination and project delays. They show the overall cost of the project decreases
as the diversity of team with respect to the cost salience of its members increase. While we also
address the e↵ects of diverse perspectives due to di↵ering perceptions of value (or equivalently,
cost) and information fidelity, we focus on a di↵erent managerial decision: to continue or not a
strategic project.
The challenge of selecting the right projects and rejecting the wrong ones has also been examined
in the literature in organizational design. Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) are among the first who
study how the structure of an organization determines the e↵ectiveness of its project selection
process which is susceptible to the two fundamental errors in decision-making: rejecting an initiative
that would have been successful (a Type I error), or approving a project that is bound to fail (a
Type II error). Sah and Stiglitz (1986) compare the two archetypal organizational structures: a
hierarchy, where a project is reviewed at all the di↵erent levels of the organization, and approval is
necessary by all levels, versus a polyarchy, where a project is selected by the organization as long
as it is approved by any one of its members. They show that hierarchies reduce Type II errors at
the expense of increasing Type I errors; polyarchies do the reverse. Sah and Stiglitz (1988) extend
the analysis to include a committee structure for which a minimum level of consensus is required
for a project to be approved. They show that a committee’s selection process can be considered a
hybrid form of the polyarchy and hierarchy.
More recently, Christensen and Knudsen (2010) extend the work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) to
allow for any hybrid organizational structure between the two archetypes. They characterize the
optimal hybrid structure that ensures a symmetrical reduction of Type I and Type II errors. Csaszar
(2013) adds to this discussion by accounting for cost and time considerations. He identifies the
optimal organizational structure for a given set of goals (e.g., maximizing profits) and constraints
(e.g., fixed budget or limited time to reach a decision).
We di↵er from the aforementioned studies along two critical dimensions: first, prior work focuses
on the role of the organizational structure, and as such it assumes a priori identical decisions mak-
ers. We focus on the e↵ect of heterogeneous decision-makers, and therefore, we allow individual
decision-makers to vary with respect to their perspectives. The only other paper that considers
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such a degree of heterogeneity is Csaszar and Eggers (2013). Yet, their conceptualization is drasti-
cally di↵erent than ours. In their setting, heterogeneity represents the di↵erent levels of expertise
(breadth of knowledge) that are available in an organization. Given that the expertise of each
member is observable, they compare the performance of di↵erent organizational structures such as
delegation to experts, majority voting, and averaging of opinions. In contrast, we focus on a par-
ticular organizational structure: an egalitarian committee where no member is considered more (or
less) expert than her peers. In our setting, all members receive equally valuable information about
the project, which is however, private to each member. Di↵erences in their preferences and inter-
pretations of this information might intervene with the information aggregation process. Our main
research question is to explore when such diversity is beneficial or detrimental for the organization.
Second, a common assumption in all of the aforementioned studies is the non-strategic nature of
the decisions of the individual members. In other words, individuals decide as if their decisions alone
determine the outcome of the selection process, without accounting for the actions of their peers.
Based on the pioneering work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), the literature on committee
decision-making accounts for such strategic considerations through the concept of strategic voting.
Despite the extensive literature on committee decision-making (for thorough reviews see Gerling
et al. (2005) and Hao and Suen (2009)), the e↵ect of diversity remains rather overlooked. Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997) consider a setting of diverse preferences where each member knows the cost
that she associates with the project (type), but is aware only of the distribution of the type of her
peers. Yet, they do not analyze how this uncertainty regarding the distribution of peers’ preferences
a↵fects the error probabilities of the committee. The paper closest to our work is Gerardi (2000).
He shows that under a specific committee decision rule (unanimous approval), the transition from
a setting where all members have identical preferences to one with diverse preferences, makes the
committee more conservative, that is, members become less likely to approve a given alternative.
Our contribution to the above literature on diverse preferences under strategic voting is three-
fold. First, we study how the error probabilities change as the preference diversity of the committee
increases, that is, as the variance of the preference distribution increases. None of the aforemen-
tioned papers discusses the e↵ect of higher variance on the decision quality. Second, our paper is
the first to model the e↵ect of interpretive diversity. We show that while higher preference diversity
is always detrimental for the committee’s decision-making process, higher interpretive diversity can
be beneficial. Third, our paper is the first to compare the e↵ect of diversity under di↵erent orga-
nizational structures, such as hierarchies and polyarchies. By contrast, all of the aforementioned
papers on strategic voting restrict their analysis to the case of a committee.
Lastly, there is an extensive literature on team diversity research in organizational behavior
(for a thorough review see van Knippenberg and Mell (2016)). However, the vast majority of this
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research is focused on characteristics such as demographic background, functional or educational
background, or personality (the so-called stable traits), rather than the more malleable attributes,
such as preferences, or the processing of information. The studies relevant for our work examine
whether diverse groups can aggregate e↵ectively their distributed information. A key finding from
this stream is that while more diverse members are likely to collectively have more information,
they may lack the social ties and interpersonal knowledge to benefit from it (Gruenfeld et al. 1996).
3. Model Setup
Consider the typical executive committee of an organization. A group of N senior executives
are tasked with the approval or rejection of a strategic project. For example executives from
di↵erent therapeutic areas, such as oncology, but also functional units, like pharmacokinetics,
convene regularly to decide which candidate compounds should continue to receive funding in
Phase IIb. We represent the committee decision process as a sequence of four distinct stages: (i)
the initial stage where individual members form their preferences regarding the project; (ii) the
individual signal interpretation stage where each member privately observes his/her signal; (iii) the
strategic consideration stage where members form expectations regarding the signals observed by
their peers, (iv) the decision-making phase where members turn their individual recommendations
into the committee’s decision outcome. We delineate schematically the decision process in Figure
1. In the following subsections we elaborate further on each stage of the decision making process.
Figure 1 The committee decision process.
Initial Stage: Initial beliefs and private preferences
At the outset, and prior to any additional information, all executives share some basic common
knowledge about the project potential. The actual potential of the project, !, is unknown and
it could either be good or bad, i.e., ! 2 ⌦ = {G,B}. The a priori probability of having a good
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project is Pr(! =G) = ⇡. If a “good” (G) project is selected, then it realizes net value V   c for
the organization where V is the revenue derived from a good project, and c is the irreversible
investment required to develop it. In the pharmaceutical industry the parameter V captures a
drug’s overall earning potential while the parameter c captures the cost of clinical trials and other
development e↵orts. If, however, a “bad” (B) project is selected, then the organization realizes no
revenue, but still expends the resources committed, resulting in a loss of c.
Let ai 2 A = {Y ES,NO} with i 2 1,2, ...,N denote the decision of the ith member and ac 2
{Y ES,NO} denote the collective decision of the entire committee. Then, for a given collective
decision and project realization, (ac,!), the utility of member i is as follows. If the committee
rejects the project (ac =NO), no investment is initiated so the payo↵ is zero in either state, i.e.,
Ui(ac =NO,!=B) =Ui(ac =NO,!=G) = 0. If the committee approves the project (ac = Y ES),
the corresponding utilities of member i for a good and a bad project are Ui(ac = Y ES,! =G) =
V   c   ti and Ui(ac = Y ES,! = B) =  c   ti, respectively, where ti denotes the ith member’s
perception of the opportunity cost. We refer to this di↵erentiation of opportunity costs as preference
diversity as it allows us to capture situations where members attach di↵erent opportunity costs to
the initiative (i.e., the value generated by the estimated resources and organizational support if
they were used for alternative project opportunities). Put di↵erently, given that these executives
represent di↵erent business units or functional divisions, their perspectives may di↵er with respect
to what constitutes a “good enough” ROI/NPV/expected profit outcome (Eisenhardt et al. 1997,
Smith and Tushman 2005, Loch and Kavadias 2011 and references therein).2
We assume that ti is private information and only known to member i. Yet, all committee
members are aware of the distribution of t0is. Each ti is drawn from the uniform distribution
U [µt   "t, µt + "t]. As such, the parameter "t captures the dispersion among the committee mem-
bers’ opportunity costs, which we use as a proxy for the magnitude of preference diversity. This
conceptualization of diversity follows the typology of Harrison and Klein (2007) as it describes the
distribution of di↵erences among the members with respect to a common attribute such as the
opportunity cost associated with the initiative.
Stage I: Assimilation of Private Information
Individual members update their prior beliefs regarding the potential of the project based on
private signals, si 2 {g, b}. The assumption of di↵erent signals reflects the key desired feature of such
organizational structures, namely, the access to independent viewpoints. It is exactly this ability of
accessing multiple signals that has advocated cross-functional committees as a statistically superior
2 Note that modeling preference diversity as heterogeneity in t, is mathematically equivalent to considering hetero-
geneity in V or c.
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decision-making mechanism. The private information reflects the fact that di↵erent individuals
resonate di↵erently with the complex information presented during decision meetings (Smith and
Tushman 2005). This is particularly so, for selection decisions in the pharmaceutical industry where
no single member can comprehend in its entirety the lengthy reports that describe the design and
the results of those clinical trials. Instead, di↵erent members resonate with the areas that are
closer to their expertise. For example, an executive from the marketing department is more likely
to assimilate the information on how di↵erentiated the benefits to patients are with respect to
existing treatments, whereas an executive from the R&D department is more likely to focus on the
pure technical properties of the drug, such as establishing a strong link between the selected target
(e.g., the protein or organ that the drug is aiming for) and the disease.
However, at such early stages, uncertainty can never be fully resolved. At best, the new infor-
mation provides an imperfect signal regarding the project’s potential. A key parameter of this
updating process is the perceived fidelity of the new information (Loch et al. 2001). Let qi denote
the fidelity that member i attributes to the new information. Mathematically, qi is the conditional
probability that the signal reflects the true project potential, i.e., Pr(si = g|!=G) = Pr(si = b|!=
B) = qi 2 ( 12 ,1). We allow executives from di↵erent business units to assign di↵erent fidelity to
the new information. Specifically, the ith member’s fidelity, qi, is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution U [µq   "q, µq + "q]. The parameter "q represents the dispersion among committee members’
fidelities, and it serves as a proxy for the range of interpretive diversity. As with the opportunity
costs, fidelity is private knowledge. Each member is aware of the fidelity she attributes to the new
information, but she is only aware of the distribution of her peers’ fidelities.
Our conceptualization of interpretive diversity reflects the di↵erent cognitive lens that each
member uses to filter new information, and in turn, the extent to which his or her belief is a↵ected
by the new information. Prior literature stresses that the existence of di↵erent cognitive lens
among executives often results to a lack of common understanding and interpretation of the new
information. For example, Dougherty (1992) notes that: “Departmental thought worlds partition
the information and insights. Each has a distinct system of meaning which colors its interpretation
of the same information, selectively filters technology-market issues, and produces a qualitatively
di↵erent understanding of product innovation” (Dougherty 1992, p.195).
Such lens are common in the biopharmaceutical industry as there is often a lack of agreement
on whether the “readout” of a clinical trial provides enough evidence for continuation in the
next stage. For instance, a long-standing, but still on-going, debate pertains to whether subgroup
analyses in clinical trials provide reliable information for the e cacy of a drug, and if so, under
what conditions. Feinstein (1998) refers to it as the “clinico-statistical tragedy” whereby there
are two sets of protagonists, both of whom are right: “The statisticians are right in denouncing
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subgroups that are formed post hoc from exercises in pure data dredging. The clinicians are also
right, however, in insisting that a subgroup is respectable and worthwhile when established a priori
from pathophysiologic principles. [...] The potential tragedy now is that what may seem to be good
statistics will be bad science.” More recently, Burke et al. (2015) o↵ers some “rules of thumb” to
assess whether subgroup analysis should be considered “reasonably credible”. The above discussion
suggests that for complex projects, the extent to which an executive “believes” the results of a
clinical trial, and therefore, decides to act upon them, entails a substantial element of personal
judgement, and that is why we assume that each member’s fidelity is private information.
To ensure consistency in the way members interpret information, we assume that each member
i2 1,2, ...,N considers her fidelity, qi, to be the correct one, that is, reflective of the true value that
the information signal carries about the project potential. This is a reasonable assumption and a
necessary one to support any formal updating mechanism of individual beliefs. Assuming otherwise,
i.e., that members do not trust their own estimations of fidelity, prohibits the use of any formal
updating mechanism. In other words, member i considers that member j with qj > qi (qj < qi)
overestimates (underestimates) the fidelity of the new information. For example, a pharmacology
expert executive, even though she recognizes the value of information related to the e cacy of a
compound, she might be concerned that a therapeutic area executive might be “reading too much
into it”. Moreover, we assume that all non-focal members share a common belief structure about
the qi of focal member i, that is, all non-focal members know that qi, is drawn from the uniform
distribution Ui[µq   "q, µq + "q]. Lastly, we assume symmetry across the committee members, so
that member i2 1,2, ...,N has the same belief structure, U [µq   ✏q, µq + ✏q], for all her peers.
Given the above assumptions, member i0s posterior belief upon receiving a signal si 2 {g, b} can
be written as follows:
Pr(G|si = g) =
Pr(si = g|G)Pr(G)
Pr(si = g|G)Pr(G)+Pr(si = g|B)Pr(B)
and
Pr(G|si = b) =
Pr(si = b|G)Pr(G)
Pr(si = b|G)Pr(G)+Pr(si = b|B)Pr(B)
.
Note that the above updating scheme is also referred to as naive or sincere (Austen-Smith
and Banks 1996) because each member i updates his/her belief on his/her signal alone, without
accounting for the actions of his/her peers. In the following section, we discuss how accounting for
peers’ actions a↵ects the above formulations.
Stage II: Accounting for peers’ actions
Rational members are aware that their payo↵ is determined by the collective outcome of the voting
process rather than their individual decisions. As such, committee members need to account for the
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actions of their peers. A series of papers (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1997) capture such strategic considerations through the concept of strategic voting, and show that
such behavior constitutes a Nash equilibrium: to maximize her expected utility a member needs to
account for peer actions, rather than assume that her actions alone determine the outcome (naive
voting).
Formally, accounting for peers’ actions, has the following implication: when comparing whether
to recommend approval or rejection, member i has to consider her expected payo↵ over all possible
combinations of her actions and the actions of her peers. In fact, the only eventuality where her
individual vote a↵ects her payo↵, is when she is pivotal. That is, when all the other members vote
in such a way that member i0s vote determines the outcome (e.g., under majority rule, half of her
peers support YES and the other half NO). In all other cases, her payo↵ is entirely determined
by the votes of her peers, so the choice between YES and NO does not a↵ect member i’s decision
(i.e., the utility of the two decisions are the same). As such, the pivotal contingency is a direct
mathematical consequence of a payo↵ maximizing strategy that accounts for peers’ actions.3
This pivotal contingency, in turn, carries information about the signals observed by her peers.
Instead of just using only her own signal to update her belief, member i can infer information about
what signals her peers might have observed, even though she hasn’t observed any of their actual
votes, through the likelihood of the pivotal contingency emerging. Mathematically, the posterior
beliefs of member i upon receiving signals si 2 {g, b} are as follows:
Pr(G|si = g, piv) =
Pr(si = g|G)Pr(piv|G)Pr(G)
Pr(si = g|G)Pr(piv|G)Pr(G)+Pr(si = g|B)Pr(piv|B)Pr(B)
Pr(G|si = b, piv) =
Pr(si = b|G)Pr(piv|G)Pr(G)
Pr(si = b|G)Pr(piv|G)Pr(G)+Pr(si = b|B)Pr(piv|B)Pr(B)
.
These formulas reflect that each member recognizes the richer informational landscape, namely
the di↵erent signals held by her peers, and accordingly that information a↵ects her posterior
belief. Therefore, compared to the updating formulas on p.10, the pivotal-based updating carries
more informational value than naive updating. Such social learning plays an important role in
the setting that motivated our study because the highly complex nature of the projects under
consideration, prohibit a member from being able to fully absorb all the relevant information
by herself. Instead, members of such committees realize that, despite the potential di↵erences in
preferences and interpretations, their peers hold valuable information, which they should somehow
account for in their decision making.
3 A simple illustration of this can be found in the online Appendix.
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Ideally, each member would observe all signals; or equivalently, have her peers truthfully reveal
their signals. However, truthful revelation is not an equilibrium (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996),
especially when members have diverse preferences (Coughlan 2000), as in our setting. Thus, the
second-best for a member is to infer the likelihood that certain combinations of signals give rise to
the pivotal contingency. Even though such information is imperfect, it o↵ers a richer information
basis to make a decision.
A number of experimental studies have demonstrated that information elicited from the pivotal
condition can significantly impact the subjects’ decision (Guarnaschelli et al. 2000, Battaglini et al.
2008, Battaglini et al. 2010, Goeree and Yariv 2011). For example, Goeree and Yariv (2011) show
that, for any voting rule, subjects may vote against their private information when the information
elicited from the pivotal contingency suggests that they do so.
It is worth highlighting here that strategic voting endogenizes a specific type of cross influence
amongst committee members. It is a form of social learning where the focal member elicits infor-
mation from her peers, and incorporates such information in her belief. At the same time, we
acknowledge that in some situations such informational considerations may be dominated by other
types of cross influences among the committee members, such as career concerns or peer pressure
(see Discussion section).
Stage III: The committee decision
Once members integrate all the available information, both from their individual private sig-
nals and the pivotal contingency, they proceed with their individual recommendations, ai 2 A =
{Y ES,NO}, regarding the project. We capture the conversion of the individual recommendations
to a collective decision through the following general decision rule: the project is pursued if approval
is recommended by at least r out of the N members. In the remainder of the paper we focus on the
case of majority rule such that r= N 1
2
. Before presenting the results of our analysis, we summarize
the assumptions of our model in the normal form of a Bayesian game.
Summary of key model components
1. There are N committee members, i 2 {1,2, ...,N} who must decide whether to approve or
reject a project. The project can be either good or bad, ! 2⌦= {G,B}
2. The type of each committee member i is ✓i = (si, ti, qi). Thus, the set of possible types is
⇥⌘ {b, g}⇥U(µt   "t, µt + "t)⇥U(µq   "q, µq + "q).
3. Each committee member votes ai 2A= {Y ES,NO} given his/her type ✓i.
4. The decision of the committee is ac = Y ES if |{i : ai = Y ES}|  r and ac =NO otherwise.
5. Given the decision of the committee and the state of nature, the utility of member i is as
follows: Ui(ac = Y ES,! =G) = V   c  ti, Ui(ac = Y ES,! =B) = c  ti, Ui(ac =NO,! =B) =
Ui(ac =NO,!=G) = 0.
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4. Analysis
In this section we characterize the e↵ects of diverse perspectives on the committee decision. First, we
discuss the e↵ects of diverse preferences (Section 4.1), and then the e↵ects of diverse interpretations
of project information (Section 4.2). We disentangle these e↵ects to illustrate how di↵erent types of
diversity give rise to di↵erent e↵ects, and therefore, they a↵ect di↵erently the decision quality of the
committee. Thus, in Section 4.1 we assume that all committee members interpret the information
through the same qi = q, whereas in Section 4.2 we consider the case where they share a common
opportunity cost ti = t. For each case, we first characterize the optimal decision of each committee
member, and then, we analyze the e↵ect of higher diversity on the collective decision quality of the
committee. Project evaluation decisions can su↵er from the two fundamental errors of rejecting
good projects (a Type I error) and approving bad ones (a Type II error). As such, we use the Type
I and Type II error probabilities as our key decision quality metric. We present our analysis for
committees that decide based on a majority rule, but where appropriate we discuss the implications
from a unanimous acceptance rule (detailed results for this case are available from the authors
upon request). Finally, our analysis corresponds to the case where the prior belief about the project
potential is Pr(! = G) = ⇡ = 0.5. This assumption is done only for notational simplicity and it
does not a↵ect qualitatively any of the results.
4.1. Diverse screening due to preference diversity
Diverse preferences correspond to the situation where committee members di↵er with respect to
their opportunity cost, as captured by the minimum expected value they require to recommend
project approval. Formally, member i recommends approval when EUi(ai = Y ES)   EUi(ai =
NO), or equivalently, when P 0(G)V  c > ti where ti is drawn from the distribution U(µt "t, µt+"t)
and P 0(G) is the posterior likelihood of success, as defined on p.11. Proposition 1 characterizes the
equilibrium decision strategy for the ith member contingent on her opportunity cost, ti, and her
private signal si 2 {g, b}.
Proposition 1 (individual member’s optimal strategy). There exist signal-contingent
opportunity cost thresholds tg and tb, with tb < tg, such that member i recommends approval if si = g
(si = b) and ti < tg (ti < tb).
As we would intuitively expect, a member recommends approval for the project when her oppor-
tunity cost is “low enough”, i.e., below a threshold value. Otherwise, she recommends rejection.
Clearly, this threshold depends on her observed signal: a good signal indicates a promising project,
and therefore, a member should have a relatively high opportunity cost to reject it. On the other
hand, in light of a bad signal, a member’s posterior valuation might become so low, that even a
relatively low opportunity cost triggers rejection of the initiative. As such, the threshold under a
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good signal always lies above the corresponding threshold under a bad signal, i.e., tb < tg. It is a
straightforward extension to show that Proposition 1 holds for any decision rule, that is, for any
value of r  N . To facilitate the explanation of our next set of results (Propositions 2 and 3),
it instructive to define the following three type of projects (Definition 1) and to disentangle how
strategic considerations a↵ect a member’s posterior belief (Corollary 1).
Definition 1. For a committee whose members have an average opportunity cost E[ti]⌘ µt, we
define a project (⇡, V, c) to be: neutral, when ⇡V  c= µt; attractive, when ⇡V  c > µt; unattractive,
when ⇡V   c < µt.
Definition 1 classifies projects with respect to the average a priori predisposition of the committee
to approve. For example, in the case of a neutral project, the a priori likelihoods, for an arbitrary
member, of recommending approval or rejection are the same, i.e., Pr(ti < ⇡V   c) = Pr(ti >
⇡V   c) = 0.5. On the other hand, for an unattractive project, an arbitrary member is more likely
to recommend rejection than approval.
Also, let  G denote the probability that a member supports the project, given that the project’s
true state is good. To derive  G note that a member may receive a good signal with probability
q, in which case she only approves the project if her type is below tg, or receive a bad signal,
with probability 1  q, in which case she only approves the project if her type is below tb. Thus,
 G = Pr(si = g|! =G)Pr(ti < tg) +Pr(si = b|! =G)Pr(ti < tb) = qF (tg) + (1  q)F (tb). Similarly,
let  B be the probability that a member recommends approval given that the project’s true state is
bad. Then, by the same token,  B = (1 q)F (tg)+qF (tb). Given the above definitions of  G and  B,
and that under majority rule, member i is pivotal when N 1
2
members have recommended approval
and N 1
2
members have recommended rejection, we can write the posterior belief of member i upon
receiving a good signal as follows:



























Corollary 1. For an attractive (unattractive) project, the existence of strategic considerations
lowers (raises) the members’ posterior beliefs. The e↵ect is amplified as the size of the committee,
N , increases. For a neutral project, strategic considerations do not a↵ect the members’ beliefs.
First note that in the absence of strategic considerations (non-strategic voting), the terms  G
and  B do not a↵ect a member’s posterior belief. According to Corollary 1, the e↵ect of the pivotal
contingency (captured in the term  B(1  B)
 G(1  G)
N 1
2 ), depends on the ex-ante predisposition of the
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committee. Consider a committee where the focal member i knows that her peers, a priori, favor
approval of the project. Under such favorable predisposition, the event of a pivotal contingency
(i.e., half of her peers recommend rejection), is associated with a substantial number of bad signals
having been observed by her peers. As such, the pivotal condition prompts to a lower posterior
belief compared to the case of non-strategic voting. Mathematically, Pr(G|si, piv) < Pr(G|si) for
any si 2 {g, b}. Conversely, for an a-priori unattractive project, the pivotal contingency would lead
to a higher posterior belief compared to the non-strategic voting case. Clearly, larger committees
are associated with a larger number of signals, and thus, the e↵ect of the pivotal contingency
becomes stronger as N increases.
Proposition 2 (effect of preference diversity on member strategy). For a neutral
project, tg and tb are invariant in the magnitude of diversity, "t. For an attractive project, tg and
tb increase in "t. For an unattractive project, tg and tb decrease in "t.
Proposition 2 highlights the moderating role that the committee predisposition has on the
e↵ect of diverse preferences. When the committee members are a priori more likely to recommend
approval (case of attractive project), higher preference diversity leads to higher threshold values,
which in turn, make the members adopt an even more favorable (for the project) approval decision
strategy. On the other hand, when members are a priori more likely to recommend rejection (case
of unattractive projects), higher preference diversity makes members adopt an even more conser-
vative strategy. Thus, in either case, preference diversity reinforces the committee’s predisposition
towards the project.
This result can be explained as follows. Consider the case of an unattractive project. For the focal
member i, the pivotal contingency implies that despite the unfavourable predisposition, half of his
peer members recommend approval. Then, the key consideration for the focal member is whether
the peers’ support stems from the observation of positive signals, or is due to their own member-
specific preferences (e.g., low opportunity costs always prompt approval irrespective of information
updates). When the preference diversity, "t, is low, the former e↵ect dominates the latter: peer
support is more likely to be driven by good signals, and therefore, strategic considerations raise
the focal member’s posterior belief.
As the preference diversity, however, increases, the preferences of the committee members become
more symmetrically distributed, and the probability mass below the threshold converges to the
probability mass above the threshold.4 As a result, the pivotal contingency becomes less informa-
tive: it is no longer an event that is associated with positive signals. Instead, it could emerge from
4 To see why, imagine the extreme scenario where "t !1, and therefore, the likelihoods would converge to 0.5.
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an equal distribution of good and bad signals. Hence, higher dispersion leads to lower posterior
beliefs, and in turn, to lower decision thresholds tg and tb.
Conversely, when a member considers her peers a priori favorable towards the project (attrac-
tive project), the pivotal contingency is associated with numerous negative signals. Again, as the
dispersion increases, the predisposition becomes less pronounced, and the focal member associates
fewer negative signals with the pivotal contingency. As such, her posterior beliefs, along with her
decision thresholds values increase. Lastly, for neutral projects, higher preference diversity does
not a↵ect the members’ strategies as peer influences are “canceled out” due to symmetry.
This result bears insightful organizational implications about the e↵ect of preference diversity on
members’ decision strategies along two dimensions. First, committees constitute an e↵ective selec-
tion mechanism due to the e↵ective information aggregation that peer inferences enable. Through
the pivotal contingency, individual members can assimilate information beyond their individual
signal. Second, the benefit from the above information aggregation process diminishes as the dis-
persion among the members’ preferences increases. Thus, preference diversity hinders a major
advantage of committees: the aggregation of peer perspectives for e↵ective decisions. A higher
dispersion among preferences increases the uncertainty that members face with respect to peer
preferences, and therefore, reduces the information that can be elicited from a pivotal contingency.
In turn, members rely more on their own private information, a decision approach that manifests
a silo perspective.
Proposition 3 (effect of preference diversity on error probabilities). For a neu-














Proposition 3 illustrates the detrimental e↵ects of preference diversity on the selection perfor-
mance of the committee.5 As the dispersion "t increases, the committee becomes more likely to
reject good projects and more likely to approve bad projects. For any neutral project, members who
observe positive information (i.e., si = g) are divided between those with opportunity costs below
tg (who approve the project), and those above tg (who reject the project). Moreover, the threshold
tg lies above the mean, µt, as a member that observes a good signal is more likely to approve
the project than to reject it. However, as the dispersion "t increases, the preferences become more
evenly distributed (in a manner similar to our argument in Proposition 2), and the likelihood that
an arbitrary member has opportunity cost below the threshold tg, i.e., Pr(ti < tg) declines (and
5 When ⇡V   c 6= µt, the complex dependance of the thresholds tb and tg on "t prohibits an analytical derivation;
through numerical analysis (available from the authors upon request) we confirmed that Proposition 3 holds.
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(a) Type I: Pr(NO|G) (b) Type II: Pr(YES|B)
Figure 2 Error probabilities under strategic and non-strategic voting. N = 5, V = 12, c= 1, q= 0.75, µt = 6.0
Pr(ti > tg) increases). As a result, the likelihood of a member, who observes a good signal, to
approve the project declines.
By the same exact logic, members who observe negative information (si = b), have a decision
threshold, tb, that always lies below µt. In that case, as "t increases, all else being equal, recom-
mending approval becomes more likely. Taken together, these results show that as the dispersion
in preferences increases, recipients of a good signal become less likely to approve the project, while
recipients of a bad signal become more likely to approve the project. In short, higher preference
diversity makes members less likely to make decisions consistent with the signals they observe, and
that is why, both Type I and Type II error probabilities increase.
The main result of Proposition 3 regarding the e↵ect of preference diversity on the error prob-
abilities remains robust across all types of projects. Furthermore, it is worth noting the e↵ect of
strategic considerations on the error probabilities. To that end, Figure 2 plots the error proba-
bilities under strategic and non-strategic voting. Note that the specific project is an unattractive
project (Definition 1), and as such, an arbitrary member is ex-ante more likely to reject the project.
Accounting for the pivotal contingency, raises the posterior beliefs of the committee members
(Corollary 1), and that is why under strategic voting members are more likely to approve an ini-
tiative than under non-strategic voting. As a result, strategic voting leads to lower Type I errors,
but higher Type II errors compared to non-strategic voting. Yet, as the dispersion "t increases, the
error probabilities of the two cases converge since the pivotal contingency becomes less informative.
Another useful benchmark for the error probabilities discussed in the extant literature, is that
of the full information equivalent where all members reveal truthfully their signals and share the
same average opportunity cost. In this case, the corresponding error probabilities are Pr(NO|G) =
Pr(Y ES|B) = 0.1. Thus, while more information lowers significantly the Type I error probability,
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it leads to higher Type II errors than the case of non-strategic voting, for low values of diversity.
This happens because, for the specific (unattractive) project depicted in Figure 2, non-strategic
voting leads to an overly conservative approach in the project selection (this can be also seen in
the high Type I errors of such a committee). On the contrary, when members reveal truthfully
their signals, the committee is more likely to accept the specific project, leading to higher Type II
errors. However, as the interpretive diversity increases, the full information case outperforms the
strategic and non-strategic voting for both Type I and II errors.
One might expect that the distorting e↵ect of preference diversity can be mitigated through
more reliable project information (i.e., higher signal fidelity). Interestingly, our analysis indicates
that the opposite is true. The detrimental e↵ect of preference diversity is pronounced for higher
information fidelity q, i.e., the increase in both Type I and Type II error probabilities is steeper
for higher q. When the members attribute higher value to the new information, i.e., q is high, the
thresholds tb and tg deviate even further away from the average, µt. This reflects the importance
of the informational value of the private signal. However, as the preference diversity increases,
members become less responsive to their signals (as per Proposition 3) and the new information, of
admittedly high value, is now lost. Consider, for example, the case of a good project. Higher fidelity
q implies that members are more likely to observe good signals (i.e., signals are more accurate
indications of the true project potential), but unfortunately the higher dispersion "t, makes them
more likely to overlook these signals (Proposition 3). Thus, even though more accurate signals are
observed, those signals are overlooked, leading to even higher likelihood for errors.
Our findings extend Gerardi (2000) who examines the e↵ect of diverse preferences under the
unanimity decision rule (r =N). He shows that the existence of private preferences makes com-
mittee members less likely to approve the project. Similar to our analysis, this happens because
the support expressed by the peers (under the pivotal contingency) might be driven by the peers’
private preferences, and not necessarily by their positive signals. Yet, we show that this result
requires further qualification under a majority rule: committees not only become more likely to
reject good projects, but they also become more likely to accept projects that are bound to fail.
Therefore, preference diversity is detrimental not only towards Type I errors (the one-side e↵ect),
but towards both types of errors, and particularly so in environments characterized by information
of high fidelity.
4.2. Diverse screening due to interpretive diversity
In this section we examine the e↵ect of diverse perspectives due to di↵erent interpretations of the
new information on the members’ decisions. Interpretive diversity implies that di↵erent committee
members assign di↵erent values on the fidelity of the information source. Specifically, member i
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assigns probability qi to the event that the observed signal is representative of the true project
potential of the project, i.e., qi = Pr(si = g|! = G) = Pr(si = b|! = B). The fidelity assigned to
the new information is private knowledge to each member. Yet, all members are aware that their
fidelity values are realized from the uniform distribution U(µq   "q, µq + "q), where "q captures the
magnitude of the interpretive diversity as measured by the dispersion of interpretations among the
committee members.
In order to analyze each member i0s optimal policy, it is useful to understand how the parameters
of the distribution a↵ect the range of the ex-post project valuations. Let qH ⌘ µq + "q and qL ⌘
µq   "q denote the maximum and minimum possible fidelity realizations, respectively. Then, for a
given project, described by the triplet (V, c,⇡), we define the following posterior project valuation
quantities:
Definition 2. We define the project ex-post valuations to be:
• V g: for a member with type qH that observes a good signal;
• V g: for a member with type qL that observes a good signal;
• V b: for a member with type qL that observes a bad signal;
• V b: for a member with type qH that observes a bad signal.
Figure 3 Opportunity cost t regions.
For example, V g =Pr(G|si = g, qH , piv)V   c, is the valuation of member i who receives a good
signal (si = g) and assigns the maximum fidelity to it (qi = qH). Then, member i approves the
project if the opportunity cost is less than the ex-post valuation V g, that is, t < V g, and rejects it
otherwise. The defined ex-post valuations divide the opportunity cost space into three regions of
interest.6 As expected, a good signal always leads to higher ex-post project valuation than a bad
6 There are two more regions that emerge, but they represent trivial cases. In the event that the opportunity cost
is extremely high t > V g, no member would recommend approval regardless of their interpretive type and signal.
Conversely, when the opportunity cost is extremely low t < V b, all members would recommend approval.
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signal. Thus, the range of ex-post valuations after observing a good signal (V g,V g) always lies above
the range of ex-post valuations after observing a bad signal, (V b,V b). Moreover, the higher the i
th
member’s qi, the more drastic the change in her ex-post belief, and thus, in her perceived project
valuation. The above quantities and their relationship to the a priori project value are illustrated
in Figure 3. Proposition 4 characterizes the ith member’s equilibrium strategy contingent on the
common opportunity cost t, her information signal si, and her fidelity qi.
Proposition 4 (individual’s member optimal strategy).
• When V b < t< V b (Region I), there exists qb 2 ( 12 ,1) such that:
— if si = g, then member i always approves the project;
— if si = b, then member i only approves the project if qi < qb and rejects it otherwise.
• When V b < t< V g (Region II),
— if si = g, then member i always approves the project;
— if si = b, then member i always rejects the project.
• When V g < t< V g (Region III), there exists qg 2 ( 12 ,1) such that:
— if si = g, then member i only approves the project if qi > qg and rejects it otherwise;
— if si = b, then member i always rejects the project.
Proposition 4 highlights that each member’s equilibrium strategy is contingent on the project’s
opportunity cost. In Region I, the project under consideration faces an opportunity cost low enough
to prompt all members with a positive signal to approve the project regardless of their interpretive
perspective. Members who observe a negative signal still approve the project, unless they consider
this information highly relevant (qi > qb). In that case, a bad signal drives a steep drop in the ex-
post project valuation, which leads them to reject the project. The exact opposite dynamics take
place in Region III where the opportunity cost is high. All members who observe negative signals
recommend rejection regardless of their interpretive perspective, while members who observe a
good signal are now divided between those who consider it relevant (qi > qg), and recommend
approval, and those who assign less value to it (qi < qg), and therefore, recommend rejection.
Finally, for an intermediate range of values for the opportunity cost (Region II), members
who observe negative signals recommend rejection (regardless of their type), and members who
observe positive signals recommend project approval. Interestingly, for those projects the members’
decisions are determined solely based on their private signal despite the presence of both interpretive
diversity and strategic considerations. This happens because for these mid-range t values, there
is a lack of any strong predisposition, and therefore, members are entirely responsive to their
signals: even if a member assigns low fidelity to his signal, a good signal is enough to make him
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recommend approval, and a bad one to make him recommend rejection. As a result, in Region
II, the pivotal contingency arises through a balanced number of good and bad signals, and as
such, it does not a↵ect members’ posterior beliefs. In other words, peer influences “cancel out”,
and members decide solely on their private signals. This result is important because it identifies
limiting (but realistic) cases for the presence of strategic voting: non-strategic voting behaviors
might emerge as equilibrium strategies endogenously for certain types of projects.
Corollary 2. In Region I (III) strategic considerations lower (raise) the members’ posterior
beliefs. The e↵ect is amplified as the size of the committee increases.
Similarly to the case of preference diversity, the pivotal contingency allows the committee mem-
bers to infer information about the signals of their peers. For example, consider Region I. Projects
are expected to be approved due to the low t. Accounting for the pivotal contingency, however,
implies that peer members received an abundance of negative information about the project, and
thus, strategic considerations lower the members’ beliefs. In Region III, a similar reasoning shows
that strategic considerations lead to higher posterior beliefs. Both e↵ects are amplified for larger
committees as the pivotal contingency is associated with a larger number of peer signals.
We proceed by examining how the magnitude of the interpretive diversity a↵ects the individual
member’s decision strategy. Recall that given the opportunity cost, t, a project (V, c,⇡) can be
classified in one of the three regions discussed in Proposition 4. Hence, for a given t, there exists at
most one threshold, qb or qg. In the discussion of our results below, we omit cases of projects that
are so promising (i.e., V much higher than c) that even when a member receives a bad signal, she is
still more likely to approve rather than reject the project. Similarly, we do not discuss cases where
a project is so challenging (i.e., V close to c) that even when a member receives a good signal, he
is still more likely to reject it rather than approving. Results for these cases are available from the
authors upon request, but are not presented here in the interest of brevity.






, both qb and qg decrease in "q.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 5, recall that the information that committee
members can extract from the pivotal contingency, is particularly valuable when the pivotal con-
tingency reflects more of the members’ signals rather than their interpretive biases. In Region I,
members who receive a good signal always recommend approval. As such, each member knows that
peer members who would recommend rejection must have observed a negative signal. The inference
for a potential project supporter is less straightforward: a member may recommend approval either
because she actually observes a positive signal, or because she overlooks a negative signal due to
her interpretive type (i.e., she assigns low fidelity to the signal).
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For example, in a committee of five members, the pivotal contingency emerges when two members
are supportive of the project and two reject it. Therefore, under the pivotal contingency, the focal
member infers that the two members who oppose the project, would have observed bad signals.
At the same time, the two members who support the project, could have observed good signals
with some likelihood. This likelihood is determined by the equilibrium threshold qb (Proposition 4).
However, as the dispersion "q increases, the probability masses around qb converge to equal values
(for the same reason as in the discussion of Proposition 2). As such, peer members become equally
likely to recommend approval and rejection of the project, simply because of their types, and
not necessarily because they observed a positive signal. This implies that the pivotal contingency
becomes less indicative of positive signals. Consequently, the posterior belief of the focal member
i decreases, which, in turn, lowers the value of qb: for a given qi a member becomes more likely
to reject the project. Similarly, in Region III, following a mirroring logic, we see that higher
interpretive diversity lowers the value of qg: for a given qi a member becomes more likely to approve
the project.
The e↵ect of interpretive diversity on error probabilities
We now discuss the e↵ect of interpretive diversity on the quality of the committee decision as
this is captured by the error probabilities for Type I and Type II errors. Note that to calculate
these error probabilities we need to consider the e↵ect of "q on both the threshold policies of each
member (Proposition 5) as well as its e↵ect on the distribution from where the qi’s are drawn. The
complex dependance of the thresholds qb and qg on the interpretive diversity "q, makes any closed-
form analysis intractable. As such, we conduct an extensive numerical study for every meaningful
combination (i.e., cases where not all members approve (reject) the initiative due to extremely
high (low) di↵erence between V and c) of the parameter values V 2 [5,10,20,30], c 2 [1,2,5,10],
N 2 [3,5,7,9], µq 2 [0.60,0.75,0.80], and "q 2 [0.05,0.10,0.15,0.20,0.25]. Table 1 summarizes the
directional e↵ects of higher dispersion "q on the Type I and Type II error probabilities.
Table 1 E↵ect of higher diversity "q on Type I and Type II error probabilities.
Region I (low t) Region II (medium t) Region III (high t)
Type I: Pr(NO|G) & invariant %
Type II: Pr(Y ES|B) % invariant &
Table 1 illustrates that the e↵ect of interpretive diversity is contingent on the opportunity cost,
t, of the project under consideration. For projects with high opportunity cost (e.g., projects which
compete with other opportunities for the same resources, or projects of low strategic priority),
higher interpretive diversity makes approval less likely, leading to higher Type I errors, but lower
Type II errors (region III). For projects with relatively low opportunity cost, t, higher interpretive
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diversity makes approval more likely, leading to lower Type I errors, but higher Type II errors
(region I). Lastly, for projects of medium opportunity cost, higher interpretive diversity does not
a↵ect the error probabilities as the members’ decision are solely determined by the realization of
their private signals regardless of their interpretive type qi. Yet, it is worth noting, that as the
interpretive diversity increases, and members become likely to ignore their signals (lower µq   "q),
V b increases and V g decrease (see Figure 3). As such, region II shrinks, and interpretive diversity
a↵ects the error probabilities throughout the value set of the opportunity thresholds. These results
can be explained as follows.
In region I, higher interpretive diversity does not a↵ect how a member responds to a good signal:
she always approves the project, regardless of her qi. By contrast, for those members who observe a
bad signal, higher interpretive diversity makes them more likely to ignore their signal and approve
the project. This happens because a higher "q, creates a more balanced distribution around the
threshold value qb, creating more probability mass below the value qb. Thus, higher diversity is
more likely to induce more members to ignore their bad signal rather than act according to their
signal. Taken together, higher interpretive diversity dilutes a member’s response to a bad signal,
while it leaves the response to a good signal una↵ected. As a result, a member becomes more likely
to approve the project. This leads to lower Type I error probabilities, but higher Type II errors
probabilities. The opposite dynamics take place in region III: higher interpretive diversity does
not a↵ect a member’s response to a bad signal, but it dilutes the response to a good signal. As
such, members become more likely to reject a project, leading to higher Type I errors, but lower
Type II errors.
Figure 4 plots the error probabilities for a project in Region III under the case of strategic
and non-strategic voting. Note that because of the high opportunity cost of any project Region
III relatively to the value V, the pivotal contingency is associated with a majority of positive
signals. Therefore, the beliefs of the committee members under strategic voting are higher than the
corresponding belief under non-strategic voting, as every committee member infers more positive
signals through their strategic considerations compared to the informational content of only one
signal. This, in turn, implies that strategic considerations lead to lower Type I errors, but higher
Type II errors.
Naturally, the question to address next is whether these results imply that interpretive diversity
is beneficial for an organization with respect to the eventual decision outcome, and if so when.
Clearly, this depends on the risk appetite of an organization, and specifically, the weights assigned
to losses stemming from Type I and II errors. In general, when the opportunity cost, t, is very
low compared to the value, V , of the project, the firm is better o↵ under a more aggressive policy
that minimizes Type I errors (so as to minimize regret from forgoing promising opportunities). At
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(a) Type I: Pr(NO|G) (b) Type II: Pr(YES|B)
Figure 4 Error probabilities under strategic and non-strategic voting. N = 5, µq = 0.75; c+tV = 0.7
the other extreme, for very high opportunity cost, the firm is better o↵ under a more conservative
approach that minimizes Type II errors (because even a successful project yields low returns).
Under such considerations, interpretive diversity plays a beneficial role in the firm’s total expected
profitability. It reduces the likelihood for the type of error that is more costly: Type I for region I
and Type II for region III. Lastly, note that under the case where all members reveal truthfully
their signals, and they share the same average fidelity, the corresponding error probabilities are
Pr(NO|G) = Pr(Y ES|B) = 0.1. Those error probabilities are the same as in Figure 2 because they
only depend on the average fidelity, the size of the committee, and the voting rule (majority).
5. Extensions
Our analysis so far has focused on a specific decision-making structure: an egalitarian committee
that decides based on a majority rule. In this section we extend our analysis to alternative decision-
making structures to identify the limitations or advantages that committees exhibit when compared
to these structures. Specifically, we explore the e↵ects of preference and interpretive diversity under
the two archetypal structures discussed in Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988): a hierarchy in which
projects need to be approved by all the successive ranks of an organization, and a polyarchy in which
projects are approved within an organization as soon as they are supported by any one member.
The former captures more hierarchical contexts with reporting lines and authority, whereas the
latter o↵ers an approximation of more “flat” organizational environments with distributed approval
power across multiple project champions. We briefly describe the corresponding model formulation
for each structure, and then we compare numerically the error probabilities of those structures to
our benchmark case of a committee.
Oraiopoulos and Kavadias:
Is Diversity (Un)Biased? 25
5.1. Preference diversity
As before, we define the probability that member i recommends approval for a good (bad) project
as follows:  iG = qF (t
i
g) + (1  q)F (tib) (  iB = (1  q)F (tig) + qF (tib)). As a parallel concept to the
pivotal contingency, in a hierarchy, we define the contingency where all members before member
i have supported the project, i.e., a1 = Y ES,a2 = Y ES, ..., ai 1 = Y ES. As a result, the posterior
belief of the members depends not only on their own signal, but also on their hierarchical position
(please see Online Appendix for the exact mathematical expressions of the posterior beliefs). Thus,
each member has his/her own threshold values tig and t
i
b. The latter are determined by solving
recursively the system of equations V Pr(G|si = g, piv)   c = tig and V Pr(G|si = b, piv)   c = tib
for every i = 1,2, ...N . Given the thresholds tig and t
i





for i = 1,2, ...,N . Finally, the error probabilities for the entire hierarchy will be Pr(NO|G) =
1 Pr(Y ES|G) = 1   1G 2G... NG and Pr(Y ES|B) =  1B 2B... NB .
In a polyarchy, we define the pivotal contingency for member i as the event where members
1,2, ..., i 1 have rejected the project.7 Following a similar procedure to derive the threshold values
(please see Online Appendix), we can calculate the probabilities  iG and  
i
B for i= 1,2, ...,N , and
in turn, the error probabilities for the polyarchy Pr(NO|G) = (1    1G)(1    2G)...(1    NG ) and
Pr(Y ES|B) = 1 Pr(NO|B) = 1  (1   1B)(1   2B)...(1   NB ).
Given the recursive nature of the thresholds and the complex updating scheme, we rely on a
numerical analysis to derive insights about the performance of the di↵erent organizational struc-
tures. Specifically, we examine all meaningful combinations (i.e., cases where thresholds exist)
for the following parameter values: N 2 [3,5,7,9], V 2 [6,8,12,14,16,18,20], c 2 [1,2,5,10], q 2
[0.65,0.7,0.75,0.80,0.85]. Our key findings are illustrated in Figure 5. First, as we would intuitively
expect, a hierarchy has higher Type I (false negatives) error probabilities than a committee, while
a polyarchy has lower Type I error probabilities than a committee. The opposite relationships hold
for the Type II errors. Second, higher preference diversity reinforces the error predisposition of
each organizational structure. Specifically, a hierarchy tends to reject a lot of projects leading to
high likelihood of a Type I error and a low likelihood of Type II error. As, the preference diversity
increases, the former increases to even higher values, making the hierarchy even more prone to a
Type I error, while the latter decreases to even lower values, making the hierarchy even less likely
to commit a Type II error. Conversely, higher preference diversity makes a polyarchy even more
prone to Type II errors, and less prone to Type I errors.
7 Note that this corresponds to a setting where a project is assessed sequentially by the di↵erent members, as opposed
to the case of a committee with a decision rule of r= 1 in which assessment by all members is simultaneous.
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(a) Type I: Pr(NO|G) (b) Type II: Pr(YES|B)
Figure 5 Error probabilities under hierarchy, polyarchy, and committee. N = 5, V = 12, c= 1, q= 0.75, µt = 6;
Intuitively, in a hierarchy, when member i receives a project proposal from member i  1, she
knows that all members before her have recommended approval. This contingency leads to a higher
posterior belief than the case where member i ignored the actions of the other members. However,
as the preference diversity increases, the informational value of this contingency is lost: previous
members might have recommended approval because of their biases rather than because of observ-
ing a good signal. Therefore, higher preference diversity leads to lower posterior beliefs, which in
turn, all else equal, make all members with i > 1 less likely to recommend approval for a project.
As such, Type I errors increase and Type II errors decrease. By contrast, in the case of a polyarchy,
when member i receives a project proposal from member i  1, she knows that all members before
her have recommended rejection. As such, the e↵ect of learning from previous members is to lower
her posterior belief. As preference diversity increases, this e↵ect is diluted, and the posterior belief
increases. As a result, all else equal, member i becomes more likely to recommend approval, leading
to lower Type I errors and higher Type II errors.
5.2. Interpretive diversity
In this section we present our findings for the e↵ect of interpretive diversity under di↵erent orga-
nizational structures (please see Online Appendix for the model formulation). Again, we rely on
a numerical analysis conducted for meaningful combinations of the following parameter values:
N 2 [3,5,7,9], c+t
V
2 [0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8], µq 2 [0.65,0.7,0.75,0.80,0.85]. As can be seen in
Figure 6, the committee structure tends again to balance the high propensity of a hierarchy for
Type I errors and of a polyarchy for Type II errors. Yet, for low value values of interpretive diver-
sity, a hierarchy might (for some parameter values) become more prone than a committee for both
Type I and II errors. This results highlights the importance of understanding the role of interpre-
tive diversity- a critical factor that might overturn the standard assumption that a hierarchy is less
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likely to approve a project than a committee. Moreover, Figure 6 shows that, just like the case of
preference diversity, interpretive diversity tends to reinforce the predisposition of both hierarchies
for even higher Type I errors and polyarchies for even higher Type II errors.
(a) Type I: Pr(NO|G) (b) Type II: Pr(YES|B)
Figure 6 Error probabilities under hierarchy, polyarchy, and committee. N = 5, µq = 0.75; c+tV = 0.3.
6. Conclusions and Managerial Insights
Even the most successful organizations invariably face the challenge of initiating new projects with-
out complete information. To tackle the challenge of such selection decisions, organizations often
rely on committees formed with senior executives that represent diverse functional and business
units. We develop a formal model to examine under what conditions such diverse perspectives are
truly beneficial for the approval and continuation of projects within organizations. We distinguish
between diverse perspectives that stem from di↵erent preferences about the value of the project,
and those that stem from diverse interpretations of new information about the project.
Our results develop managerial intuition along three dimensions. First, we show that diverse
perspectives are rarely “averaged out”. Instead, diversity leads the committees to systematic biases
in their decision making. To mitigate the e↵ect of diverse perspectives, managers need to uncover
the sources of diversity: does diversity originate from di↵erent individual valuations and prefer-
ences, or does it express di↵erent perceptions about the information that arises during the project
execution? We show that this distinction is crucial. Higher preference diversity always leads to
higher likelihood of making the wrong decision. Higher interpretive diversity, instead, can become
a powerful lever in improving the project decision making process.
Second, we show that the implications of higher preference diversity are not limited to a more
conservative selection process as prior research has suggested (Gerardi 2000). We show that diverse
committees not only become more likely to reject good projects that would have succeeded, but
also more likely to accept projects that are bound to fail. One might suggest that a more reliable
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information source mitigates these e↵ects. Yet, the opposite is true: these negative implications
worsen when the committee members have access to more reliable information. This is precisely
when preference diversity prevents members from realizing the substantial informational benefits,
and leads to a steeper drop in the performance of a committee’s selection process.
A clear managerial action is the need to identify and reduce such preference diversity. For
instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, such committees consist of executives that represent dif-
ferent therapeutic areas (TA) such as cardiovascular, oncology, neuroscience etc., which reflect the
di↵erent product lines of the company. The opportunity cost of pursuing the development of a
new compound, depends largely on the other projects in the TAs pipeline. As such, it can vary
significantly across the TAs. For example, approval of a new oncology project might mean that
another oncology project might have to be placed on hold (or even abandoned). In that case, the
opportunity cost for the new project will be relatively high. This e↵ect has been empirically shown
in Girotra et al. (2007) who find that that the value of a compound is smaller when the firm
has more projects in its portfolio that require the same resources as the current project (even if
they are aimed at di↵erent markets). Senior management can intervene and reduce the extent of
preference diversity by highlighting the need for more transparency in the pipeline of the TA, and
specifically, in the resources that are required. It is important to note here, that given the highly
technical nature of these projects, appropriate group incentives might be required to reinforce such
collaborative behaviors (Schlapp et al. 2015).
Lastly, our numerical analysis shows how management can leverage interpretive diversity to
improve the project decision-making process. Interpretive diversity in our paper accounts for set-
tings where some executives might interpret the new evidence as highly relevant while others as
rather irrelevant. An ongoing debate in drug development investment decisions is whether evidence
from early stage clinical trials helps to infer meaningful information about the “payer’s” perceptive
(i.e., whether the reimbursement bodies will see enough value for money). Executives from R&D
tend to argue that at that early stage such information is highly inconclusive, while executives from
the market access department tend to consider such information highly critical for any funding
decision.
A key managerial implication from our work is that diverse perspectives in the interpretation of
new information are valuable. In settings with low opportunity cost, such diversity results in more
aggressive approvals: lower Type I errors at the expense of higher Type II errors. This would be
particularly beneficial for a small biotech company with very limited alternative options to deploy
its resources (low opportunity cost). The same could also be particularly beneficial in settings
of drug patents running out (patent cli↵s) where companies would need to aggressively populate
their pipelines. On the other hand, when the opportunity cost is very high, approving the current
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project implies forgoing other promising ones. Then, higher interpretive diversity leads to a more
conservative decision: lower Type II errors at the expense of higher Type I. For example, in a large
pharmaceutical company, it could be argued that avoiding Type II errors is more important than
making Type I errors, because a large firm can deploy their capital in other ways to increase the
company’s value (more marketing, in-licensing e↵orts, etc.). As discussed above, there are many
ways that the firm can a↵ect the composition of such executive committees depending on the type
of project under consideration and the policy that it would like to reinforce. Our model provides
directional guidelines that inform these decisions.
7. Discussion
The process of making selection decisions in executive committees is a complex topic and subject
to the specific characteristics of the project under consideration. While we believe that our assump-
tions and model formulation are relevant for a wide range of projects, alternate specifications might
be more relevant for certain types of projects. First, throughout our paper, we assume that commit-
tee members receive di↵erent signals. This assumption aimed to capture the multi-faceted nature
of projects, but clearly, some projects might have a much narrower scope or performance metric.
For those projects, the signals that the members receive might be correlated, or at the extreme,
identical to each other. In the latter case, there is no informational value to be gained from the
pivotal contingency as all members observe the same signal. Thus, strategic voting degenerates to
naive voting. From a mathematical standpoint, all our key results regarding the e↵ect of preference
and interpretive diversity remain valid. At the same time, in such a setting, it remains an open
question whether a committee is the right decision-making structure. Alternatively, the go/no-go
decision could be delegated to the member whose area of expertise better matches the nature of
the project.
Second, our model assumes that both the opportunity cost as well as the fidelity of each member’s
signal is private knowledge. This assumption reflects not only the di↵erent “agendas” that are
present is such committees, but more importantly, that such agendas are rarely transparent to
the rest of the committee. In cases, however, where the members’ types are publicly observable,
a critical question arises: would the members “average out” their di↵erent perspectives or would
they agree to disagree? In the former case, the existence of an “average member” implies that,
on expectation, diversity does not a↵ect the performance of the committee (similarly to the full
information equivalent case discussed in our analysis). In the latter case, our model formulation
remains relevant, but members’ response functions are no longer symmetric. In fact, each member
has a unique best response function which takes into account the exact realized types (opportunity
costs or signal fidelities) of his/her peers. Although such a model is clearly intractable, it is worth
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noting that those realized values will only a↵ect the magnitude of the focal member’s posterior
belief, and not its monotonicity with respect to the opportunity cost or the signal fidelity. As such,
we would expect our threshold policies to still hold. Moreover, because our results on the error
probabilities hold for any threshold value (subject to the conditions identified in the respective
propositions) we believe that our key findings for the role of preference and interpretive diversity
would still remain valid.
Third, our model captures a specific type of cross influence among the committee members.
While this assumption might be a reasonable approximation for settings where eliciting information
from other members’ is a critical factor, there are clearly other type of peer influences that can
a↵ect a member’s voting behaviour. For instance, Levy (2007) focuses on reputation and career
concerns and finds that the latter give rise to a conformity e↵ect among the committee members.
Our model could be modified to include such considerations, and we believe that doing so would
be a promising avenue for future work. Lastly, our analysis focuses on a specific performance
metric, namely, the error probabilities. While we believe that this a key objective of the executive
committees that motivated our study, one could envision committees with alternative ones (e.g.,
brainstorming about the design of a new product). Understanding the e↵ects of preference and
interpretive diversity in those settings remains an open question and a fruitful avenue for future
research.
References
Arrowsmith, John. 2011. Trial Watch: Phase II and Phase III attrition rates 2008-2010. Nature Reviews
Drug Discovery 10 328–329.
Austen-Smith, David, Je↵rey S Banks. 1996. Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury
theorem. American Political Science Review 90(01) 34–45.
Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca B Morton, Thomas R Palfrey. 2008. Information aggregation and strategic
abstention in large laboratory elections. The American Economic Review 98(2) 194–200.
Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca B Morton, Thomas R Palfrey. 2010. The swing voter’s curse in the laboratory.
The Review of Economic Studies 77(1) 61–89.
Behnke, Nils, Norbert Hueltenschmidt. 2010. Changing pharmas innovation dna. Bain and Company .
Burke, James F, Jeremy B Sussman, David M Kent, Rodney A Hayward. 2015. Three simple rules to ensure
reasonably credible subgroup analyses. Bmj 351 h5651.
Chao, Raul O, Kenneth C Lichtendahl, Yael Grushka-Cockayne. 2014. Incentives in a stage-gate process.
Production and Operations Management 23(8) 1286–1298.
Christensen, Michael, Thorbjorn Knudsen. 2010. Design of decision-making organizations. Management
Science 56(1) 71–89.
Oraiopoulos and Kavadias:
Is Diversity (Un)Biased? 31
Cook, David, Dearg Brown, Robert Alexander, Ruth March, Paul Morgan, Gemma Satterthwaite, Menelas N
Pangalos. 2014. Lessons learned from the fate of astrazeneca’s drug pipeline: a five-dimensional frame-
work. Nat Rev Drug Discov 13(6) 419–431.
Cooper, Robert G. 2009. How companies are reinventing their idea-to-launch methodologies. Research-
Technology Management 52(2) 47–57.
Coughlan, Peter J. 2000. In defense of unanimous jury verdicts: Mistrials, communication, and strategic
voting. American Political Science Review 94(02) 375–393.
Csaszar, Felipe A. 2013. An e cient frontier in organization design: Organizational structure as a determinant
of exploration and exploitation. Organization Science 24(4) 1083–1101.
Csaszar, Felipe A, JP Eggers. 2013. Organizational decision making: An information aggregation view.
Management Science 59(10) 2257–2277.
Dougherty, Deborah. 1992. Interpretive barriers to successful product innovation in large firms. Organization
science 3(2) 179–202.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M, Jean L Kahwajy, LJ Bourgeois. 1997. Conflict and strategic choice: How top
management teams disagree. California Management Review 39(2) 42–62.
Feddersen, Timothy, Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1997. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections
with private information. Econometrica 1029–1058.
Feinstein, Alvan R. 1998. The problem of cogent subgroups: a clinicostatistical tragedy. Journal of clinical
epidemiology 51(4) 297–299.
Gerardi, Dino. 2000. Jury verdicts and preference diversity. American Political Science Review 94(02)
395–406.
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Illustrative example of the pivotal contingency Consider a committee of three members that
decides based on a unanimous acceptance rule, e.g., a compound gets approved for funding during
the Phase IIb, only if all three members support it. Focal member 1 recommends approval only
if EU1(Y ES) > EU1(NO) where the expectation accounts for the possible recommendations of
the other two members, and the fact that the member 1’s payo↵ depends on these recommenda-
tions. With a slight abuse of notation, let Pr(a2a3) denote the probability that members 2 and 3
recommend a2 = {Y ES,NO} and a3 = {Y ES,NO}, respectively. Then, we can write member 1’s
expected utilities from voting YES and NO, respectively, as follows:
EU1(Y ES) = Pr(Y ES,Y ES)U1(Y ES|Y ES,Y ES)+Pr(Y ES,NO)U1(Y ES|Y ES,NO)+
Pr(NO,Y ES)U1(Y ES|NO,Y ES)+Pr(NO,NO)U1(Y ES|NO,NO)
and
EU1(NO) = Pr(Y ES,Y ES)U1(NO|Y ES,Y ES)+Pr(Y ES,NO)U1(NO|Y ES,NO)+
Pr(NO,Y ES)U1(NO|NO,Y ES)+Pr(NO,NO)U1(NO|NO,NO).
However, since unanimous acceptance is required for the project to be approved,
U1(Y ES|Y ES,NO) = U1(Y ES|NO,Y ES) = U1(Y ES|NO,NO) = U1(NO|Y ES,Y ES) =
U1(NO|Y ES,NO) = U1(NO|NO,NO) = 0, as in all of the above contingencies the project is
rejected irrespective of the focal member’s decision. In short, the condition EU1(Y ES)>EU1(NO)
is equivalent to U1(Y ES|Y ES,Y ES)> U1(NO|Y ES,Y ES) which represents the pivotal contin-
gency: the other two members express support for the project. Proposition 1 below shows more
formally how a utility maximization strategy results in the pivotal contingency.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows the same logic as in Lemmas 1 and 2 in Gerardi
(2000). Similarly, we focus on symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which players do not use
1
2 Author: Article Short Title
weakly dominated strategies. Let  (z,!) be the probability that exactly z members (out of the
remaining N   1) recommend approval when the state is ! 2 {G,B}. Then, the expected utility of
member i, if she recommends approval is:
EUi(ai = Y ES) = Pr(G|si)
N 1X
z=r 1




as the project gets approved when more than r  1 peer members have supported it, while if she
recommends rejection is:
EUi(ai =NO) = Pr(G|si)
N 1X
z=r




as the project gets approved when more than r peer members have supported it.
Member i recommends approval, i.e., ai = Y ES, if and only if :
EUi(ai = Y ES) EUi(ai =NO), or equivalently,
Pr(G|si) (r  1,G)(V   c  ti)+Pr(B|si) (r  1,B)( c  ti)  0, or equivalently,
ti  Pr(G|si) (r 1,G)Pr(G|si) (r 1,G)+Pr(B|si) (r 1,B)V   c, or equivalently,
ti Pr(G|si, piv)V   c
where Pr(G|si, piv) denotes the posterior belief about the project being good (! = G) of a
member that receives a signal si and conditions on the event of being pivotal (r   1 members
recommend approval). Therefore, an expected utility maximization strategy is equivalent to a
member accounting for the pivotal contingency. Also note that, given that we are looking at
equilibria in which players do not use weakly dominated strategies (i.e., before observing her signal
or her type a member has a positive probability to approve or reject the project), the probability
that a member’s vote is pivotal is strictly positive. Moreover, the posterior belief of member i upon




which satisfies 0 < Pr(G|si, piv) < 1, given that Pr(piv|G) > 0 and Pr(piv|B) > 0. Thus, there
exist threshold values tg and tb such that a member recommends approval when the opportunity cost
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she assigns to the project, ti, is below the cuto↵ determined by the posterior values for a good and
bad signal, respectively, that it, ti  tg =Pr(G|si = g, piv)V   c and ti  tb =Pr(G|si = b, piv)V   c.
Proof of Corollary 1. In Proposition 1 we showed that a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is completely characterized by the pair (tg, tb) which denote the cuto↵ thresholds associated with
a good and a bad signal, respectively. We can now formally derive those thresholds by solving the

























From the last two equations, we get tb = k(tg)⌘ (1 q)
2(c+tg)V
(1 q)2(c+tg)+(V (c+tg))q2 .
Moreover, under strategic voting, the posterior belief of member i upon receiving a good signal
is:











while under non-strategic voting, the corresponding belief is:







It is straightforward to show (by substitution) that for neutral projects (µt = ⇡V   c), the
threshold values are tg = qV   c and tb = (1  q)V   c, in which case, again by simple substitution,
we get  G +  B = 1. As such,
 B(1  B)
 G(1  G)
= 1 and both strategic and non-strategic voting lead to the









=  4(tg + c)(V   tg   c)((1  2q)(tg + c)+ q
2
V )(q  0.5)2
[( 2q2 + q)(tg + c)2 +(3q2V +( 3V   2"t +2µt)q+V + "t  µt)(tg + c)+V q2("t  µt)]2





=  4(tg + c)(V   tg   c)((1  2q)(tg + c)+ q
2
V )(q  0.5)2
[(2q2   q)(tg + c)2 +( 3q2V +(3V   2"t   2µt)q V + "t +µt)(tg + c)+V q2("t +µt)]2
is negative, and therefore, 1  B
1  G





) decreases in µt.
Lastly, recall that for an unattractive project, µt > ⇡V   c, therefore, ( B G )(
1  B
1  G
)< 1, and as
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Similarly, for an attractive project, µt < ⇡V  c, therefore, ( B G )(
1  B
1  G
)> 1, and the posterior belief
is lower than the case of non-strategic voting.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Corollary 1 we know that tb = k(tg) ⌘ (1 q)
2(c+tg)V
(1 q)2(c+tg)+(V (c+tg))q2 .
Since tb monotonically increases in tg, it is su cient to focus only on tg. Let the function V (t) =
Pr(G|si = g, piv)V   c  t denote the total value that a member with threshold t anticipates from









We begin by showing that @V (tg)
@t
< 0. To show the latter, it is su cient to show that
















) increases in t. To show the latter, we start by show-
ing that  B
 G
increases in t. Taking the derivative w.r.t. t we have ( B
 G
)0 = ( (1 q)F (t)+qF (k(t))
qF (t)+(1 q)F (k(t)))
0 =
(1 2q)[F 0(t)F (k(t)) F (t)F 0(k(t))]
[qF (t)+(1 q)F (k(t))]2 . We only need to examine the sign of the numerator. After substitut-
ing and some algebraic manipulation: F 0(t)F (k(t))   F (t)F 0(k(t)) = (1   2q) (t) where  (t) =
(V q2+(V + "t µt)(1 2q)(c+ t)2+2V q2("t µt)(c+ t) V 2q2("t µt). But,  
00
(t) = (V q2+(V +










increases in t.We now show that 1  B
1  G
























where  1(t) = (q2V +(µt + "t  V )(2q  1)(c+ t)2   2q2V (µt + "t)(c+
t) + q2V 2(µt + "t) and  2(t) = q(1   2q)(c + t) + (3q2V + (2µt + 2"t   3V )q   (µt + "t))(c + t)  
V q





















) also increases in t. Thus, @V (t)
@t
< 0.
We now examine the sign of @V
@"t
. Let t0 ⌘ ⇡V   c. Note that when µt = t0, we can derive a closed
form solution for the system defined by the equations Pr(G|si = g, piv)V   c = tg and Pr(G|si =











2µtq2V + 2V (c + t)[q(1   q)   V   4µtq + 2q(c + t) + 2µt   (c + t)] and  4(µt) = [(q(2q   1)(c +
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t)2 +( 3q2V +( 2µt +3V   2"t)q+µt  V + "t)(c+ t)+V q2(µt + "t)][(q(1  2q)(c+ t)2 +(3q2V +
(2µt   3V   2"t)q µt +V + "t)(c+ t)+V q2("t  µt)]. Note that @ 3@µt = 2q
2
V   2(c+ t)(2q  1)> 0
because V > c+ t and q2 > 2q   1. So,  3(µt) increases in µt. Also note, that  3(µt = t0) = 0, so
 3(µt)< 0, for µt < t0, and  3(µt)> 0 for µt > t0. Thus, for µt < t0,
@ 
@"t
< 0, and @V
@"t
> 0. Similarly,
for µt > t0,
@V
@"t
< 0. To conclude, by applying the IFT, dtg
d"t
> 0 for µt < t0 ⌘ ⇡V   c, and dtgd"t < 0
when µt > t0 ⌘ ⇡V   c. Thus, tg (and tb) increase in "t when µt > t0 ⌘ ⇡V   c, and decrease in "t
when µt < t0 ⌘ ⇡V   c.
Proof of Proposition 3. We are interested in the sign of @ G
@"t
= q @F (tb)
@"t








= (tb µt) 12"2t . Also, for µt = ⇡V  c, the threshold values are tg =




0 which implies that membes who receive good signals become less likely to approve a good project.






> 0 which implies that members who receive a bad signal




















they both increase in "t.
Proof of Proposition 4. Similarly to the case of preference diversity, which was discussed
in Proposition 1, we focus our attention on symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which play-
ers do not use weakly dominated strategies. Again, a member votes in favor of the project if
Pr(G|si, qi, piv)V   c   t, but in this case the type of a member determines the value qi that he
assigns to the signal si. If si = g, Pr(G|si = g, qi, piv) increases in qi, and thus, there is a unique
threshold qg such that Pr(G|si = g, qg, piv)V   c= t. If si = b, Pr(G|si = b, qi, piv) decreases in qi,
and thus, there is a unique threshold qb such that Pr(G|si = b, qb, piv)V   c= t.
To determine the above thresholds qg and qb we need to solve the following system: Pr(G|si =
g, qg, piv)V   c= t and Pr(G|si = b, qb, piv)V   c= t Note, however, that for a given t and a distri-
bution qi ⇠ U(µq   eq, µq + eq), Pr(G|si = g, qi, piv)> Pr(G|si = b, qi, piv), and hence, at most one
of the above equations can be satisfied.
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In particular, a member that receives a good signal has a minimum ex-post valuation of V
g
, and
therefore when the threshold t falls into Region I, he always approves the project. The decision of
a member that receives a bad signal, however, depends on his interpretive type as in that range
members with relative high qi will reject the project (Pr(G|si = b, qH , piv)V   c < t), but members
with relatively low qi will approve the project (Pr(G|si = b, qL, piv)V   c > t) as they still see
su cient value in it. From the last two inequalities, and given that the ex-post project valuation
is continuous in qi, there exists qb in Region I, such that Pr(G|si = g, qb, piv)V   c = t. When t
falls into Region II, however, Pr(G|si = g, qi, piv)V   c > t and Pr(G|si = b, qi, piv)V   c < t for
every qi, so members decide based on their signals alone, regardless of their interpretive type.
Lastly, when the threshold t falls into Region III, a member that receives a bad signal has a
maximum ex-post valuation of V b, and therefore always rejects the project. On the other hand,
the decision of a member who receives a good signal depends on his interpretive type: for relatively
high qi he approves the project (i.e., Pr(G|si = g, qH , piv)V   c > t), while for relatively low qi
he recommends rejection (i.e., Pr(G|si = g, qL, piv)V   c < t). From the last two inequalities, and
the continuity of the ex-post project valuation in qi, there exists qg in Region III, such that
Pr(G|si = g, qg, piv)V   c= t.
Proof of Corollary 2.
In region I, under strategic voting, the belief of member i upon receiving a bad signal is:











while under non-strategic voting, the corresponding belief is:







Thus, all we need to show is that  B(1  B)
 G(1  G)
> 1. Note that in region I a member that receives
a good signal always accepts a project, while a member i that receives a bad signal approves
the project if qi < qb. Thus,  G = q + (1   q)F (qb) and  B = (1   q) + qF (qb). So,  B(1  B) G(1  G) =






> 1 because q > 1  q. The proof for region III follows exactly
the same steps.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that qb denotes the threshold value for which













. The proof follows steps with
that of proposition 2: we first define the appropriate function, and then apply the implicit function













. We first show that @G
@q
< 0, and then
we derive the sign of @G
@"q
. To show that @G
@q
< 0, it is su cient to show that   ⌘  B(1  B)
 G(1  G)
increases











( q2+µqq µq+"q+q("q c))2 so we need to show that
 5(q)⌘ q4 + (2("q   µq)  1)q3 + (µ2q   "2q   3"q + 2µq)q2b + ("2q   µ2q)q + "q(µq   "q)< 0. First note
that, @ 5
@µq
= 2q(1  q)(q  µq) + "q. If q > µq then clearly @ 5@µq > 0. If q < µq, then since q > µq  "q,
or equivalently "q > (q  µq)> 0 and 1> 2q(1  q)> 0, by multiplying the last two inequalities,
we get "q > 2q(1  q)(q µq), or equivalently, 2q(1  q)(q µq) + "q > 0. Thus, @ 5@µq > 0 for every
q. Also, for µq = 1,  5(q)⌘ q4+(2"q   3)q3+(3  "2q   3"q)q2+("2q   1)q+ "q(1  "q). It is trivial to




> 0, and @G
@q
< 0.
We now study the sign of @G
@"q




[(1 q)(q("q µq)+"q q2+q)]2 , so the sign of
@ 
@"q
is determined by the sign of µq   q. Define bVb such that
when t = bVb, then qb = µq. Intuitively, for that specific value of the opportunity cost, a member
who observes a bad signal is equally likely to accept or reject the project. We are interested in
cases, where members who receive a bad signal are more likely to recommend rejection rather than








Hierarchy: Recall that the posterior probability of member i is:





Therefore, in a hierarchy, the posterior beliefs of member i upon receiving a good and a bad signal
are respectively:















































where for i= 1 the expressions simplifies to Pr(G|s1 = g) = q and Pr(G|s1 = b) = 1  q.
Polyarchy
In a polyarchy, the posterior beliefs of member i= 2, ...,N upon receiving a good and bad signal
are respectively:












































Interpretive diversity Note that the formulas for the posterior belief of member i, with i =
1, ...,N remain the same as in the case of preference diversity. The only di↵erence with the analysis
of the previous subsection, is that now the decision of each member i is determined by how her type
qi compares to her thresholds qig and q
i
b
. These thresholds are determined by solving recursively
the system of equations V Pr(G|si = g, qig, piv)  c= t and V Pr(G|si = b, qib, piv)  c= t for every




are derived, the probabilities of member i recommending









(1   q̄)(1   F (ti
g
)) + q̄F (qi
b
) where q̄ is the actual probability of member i receiving the correct
signal. Note that unlike the committee case where only one threshold existed at a time, in this
case it is possible for both thresholds to exist. Finally, the error probabilities for the hierarchy and
polyarchy are calculated using the same formulas as in the case of preference diversity.
